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 One of the foundational features of early English common law was its use of custom to 
set legal rules. At that time, the common law used the term “custom” to encompass the practices 
and norms both of the entire kingdom and of particular communities. Prior to an organized legal 
system, practices and norms regulated local behavior and facilitated the resolution of disputes. 
As legal systems in England began to develop, custom shaped, guided, and often defined the law. 
The incorporation of custom by courts served an important role in getting communities to 
support the authority of the growing judiciary. Today, custom—particularly in the form of 
industry practices and social norms—remains an important tool in common law adjudication. 
 One might think that because of the dominance of statutory frameworks governing 
today’s intellectual property laws, custom would have a limited or even a non-existent role in 
determining the scope of intellectual property rights. Perhaps because of this initial impression 
scholars have often overlooked or dismissed the impact of custom on intellectual property law. 
Elsewhere I have refuted this common misperception and documented the frequent consideration 
and incorporation of custom into intellectual property law.1 Custom shapes the scope of 
privileges afforded to intellectual property owners, and the access and use rights of the public. 
When courts have considered custom in the context of intellectual property, they often have used 
industry practices to limit use and access rights. These courts, however, have not engaged with 
the important question of whether these particular customs are worthy of consideration and even 
if they are, whether they should rise to the level of a dispositive legal rule. I contend that custom 
should rarely be determinative of a particular legal inquiry, but it can (if appropriately cabined) 
provide some meaningful evidence for a number of inquiries in intellectual property cases.2 
 In this essay, I focus on one important facet of the subject of what role custom should 
play in intellectual property law—how longstanding common law principles should inform our 
understanding of custom. The common law provides a number of lessons on how to 
appropriately limit the consideration of custom in intellectual property law and elsewhere. In this 
discussion, I will use copyright law and its fair use doctrine as the primary lens through which to 
consider custom. Copyright is a particularly important example of the incorporation of custom 
not only because it is representative of the treatment of custom in intellectual property more 
broadly, but also because a number of recent efforts to expand the scope of permissible uses of 
others’ copyrighted works have relied on custom.  
 I begin by considering the traditional role of custom in the common law. I then consider 
several of the ways that courts have incorporated custom into copyright law, particularly in the 
context of determining fair use. I also discuss recent efforts to use custom to ameliorate both the 
uncertainty of fair use and copyright’s ever-expanding boundaries. I next critique the unreflected 
reliance on custom and consider appropriate limits on custom’s role, taking into consideration the 
traditional common law limits on the use of custom. Finally, I suggest a number of useful 
insights (other than the provision of legal rules) that custom provides for copyright law. 
 
THE TRADITIONAL ROLE OF CUSTOM AT COMMON LAW 
 
 Under common law dating at least to the late 1400s in England, “general customs” 
formed the basis of the law itself. William Blackstone, one of the foremost commentators on 
early common law, writing in the 1700s, defined the common law as “[t]hat ancient collection of 
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unwritten maxims and customs [that] had subsisted immemorially.”3 The two main advantages of 
using longstanding community (either local or kingdom-wide) customs were that they were 
thought to be “universally known” and were viewed as originating with the communities and 
people rather than being imposed by the King.4 Accordingly, communities were more willing to 
defer to these custom-based legal rules that largely reflected their prior understanding of 
appropriate conduct.  
 Blackstone distinguished these general customs from those that were particular to a 
specific locality or community. Local or particular customs could sometimes trump general 
custom or the common law—which governed kingdom-wide—when applied within the relevant 
community. Much of the Blackstonian discussion of particular customs focused on their role in 
defining the scope of public use and access rights to private land. In contrast to property 
doctrines like prescription, custom permitted access and use not by a particular person but by the 
broader public.  
 There are numerous examples of the public obtaining access and use rights to private 
property on the basis of custom; for example, English courts held—on the basis of customary 
use—that the public could hold annual dances, conduct horse races, play cricket, fish, gather 
wood, and graze animals on various private lands.5 Carol Rose has described many of these 
customary uses as “recreational” in nature and preferred because they support social engagement 
and connections in a community.6 Many of the uses were also of a subsistence nature. During the 
enclosure movement in England beginning in the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries, 
landowners increasingly excluded citizens from land that they had previously relied on for food 
and fuel.7 The English historian E.P. Thompson describes custom during this period as a 
response to this enclosure of land. The customary use arguments challenged efforts by property 
owners to move property in the direction of a virtually absolute right.8 The concept of property 
providing an absolute right to exclude others now dominates property discourse, but at the time 
of the enclosure movement this understanding of property was still very much contested. 
 Having briefly considered the traditional role of custom at common law, I will next 
consider custom in a very different context and era—copyright law and particularly more recent 
evaluations of the fair use defense by American courts. Although I agree with those scholars who 
have criticized analogies between intellectual property and real property,9 the commonalities of 
the customary use discussions are significant. To the extent that they are different, the non-
rivalrous nature of copyrighted works weighs in favor of more liberal rather than more restrictive 
customary use rights. This is so because uses of intellectual property do not deplete the resource 
or diminish the property itself. If unchecked, such uses may reduce the value of the intellectual 
property or perhaps interfere with its distribution, but greater latitude may be appropriate given 
the ability of multiple parties to use the same intangible work at the same time.  
 
THE INCORPORATION OF CUSTOM INTO COPYRIGHT LAW 
 
 Although custom does not have the same hallowed status as it once did, custom continues 
to play an important role in American jurisprudence. Rather than being the preferred starting 
point for any legal rule, the status of custom is now contested and debated. Different areas of law 
(and different inquiries within those areas) treat custom differently.  In tort law, for example, 
there have been ongoing debates about whether the development of customary safety precautions 
by a particular industry should be an absolute defense to tort liability, no defense at all, or simply 
some evidence of negligence or lack thereof. The dominant contemporary principle—though 
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with a few notable exceptions—is that custom should be some evidence of reasonable care, but 
not its measure.10 In property law, courts and scholars continue to debate whether the public’s 
longstanding use of land can form the basis of a right to access and use private property. This 
issue has often arisen in the context of public access to beaches that are privately owned.11 In 
contract law, scholars and courts have disagreed about whether industry practices should be read 
into contracts as implied terms and also, less controversially, whether such practices should 
inform the interpretation of existing contract terms.12  
 Despite longstanding discussions of custom in other areas of the law, only recently have 
intellectual property scholars begun to consider in any depth the role of custom in the field. Yet, 
intellectual property rules, both as a de facto and de jure matter, incorporate many practices and 
norms that shape the scope of intellectual property rights. In copyright law, custom has affected 
determinations of authorship, ownership, copyrightability (such as whether something is 
original), and whether a use is infringing—especially whether something is an idea or 
expression, or a scènes à faire. Custom has most frequently been considered in evaluating 
whether a particular use of a copyrighted work is a fair use and therefore not infringing. I will 
primarily focus here on the fair use doctrine and the role of custom in defining its parameters. 
 If a use of a copyrighted work is fair, then a person or entity can use a copyrighted work 
without permission or payment. There are no bright-line rules, however, for determining when a 
use is fair. Instead, Congress has set forth a four-factor analysis to assist courts in evaluating fair 
uses. The four factors consider the purpose and character of the use (in particular, whether it is 
commercial or for nonprofit educational use); the nature of the underlying work; the amount and 
substantiality of the portion used in relation to the copyrighted work as a whole; and finally, the 
effect on the potential market for or value of the copyrighted work.13 The preamble of the 
statutory fair use section states that uses of copyrighted works for “criticism, comment, news, 
reporting, teaching[,] scholarship and research, [are] not an infringement of copyright.”14 The 
terms of the fair use statute largely grew out of the common law development of a fair use 
defense.15 The codification of fair use was intended to incorporate the common law, but still 
leave open room for the continued development of the doctrine by the courts.16 
 Custom most often arises in fair use analysis in two ways. First, under the codified fair 
use factors, courts look to custom to evaluate the market effects of a particular use of a 
copyrighted work. Courts often consider failure to pay the “customary price” of a work as 
dispositive of the fair use determination. This focus on customary pricing in copyright decisions 
stems in part from the Supreme Court’s 1985 decision in Harper & Row Publishers, Inc. v. 
Nation Enters., Inc.17 In Harper & Row, the Court looked at customary practices to determine 
whether a use was commercial in the context of the first fair use factor: “The crux of the 
profit/nonprofit distinction is not whether the sole motive of the use is monetary gain but 
whether the user stands to profit from exploitation of the copyrighted material without paying the 
customary price.”18  
 The “customary price” analysis, although ostensibly a factor-one inquiry, fits more 
appropriately into the logic of factor four which evaluates harm to the actual and potential 
markets for a work. When there is a custom to license a copyrighted work or a genre of works, 
courts often hold that failure to pay that price amounts to market harm even when the uses would 
otherwise be good candidates for fair use. In Ringgold v. Black Entertainment Television, for 
example, the producers of a television sitcom used a poster of the plaintiff’s artwork in the 
background of a set without permission. The poster was visible for less than thirty seconds, was 
never the focal point of any shot, was not referred to in the dialogue, and was lawfully 
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purchased.19 Nevertheless, the court rejected a fair use defense in the case because the producers 
had not followed the television and film industry practice of licensing copyrighted works used as 
set dressing. The defendants had therefore failed to pay the “customary price,” and could not 
benefit from the fair use defense. Other courts, including the district court in Ringgold, that have 
not considered custom in their analyses have held to the contrary and concluded that such uses of 
copyrighted works in the background of television and film sets are either de minimis or fair.20 
Unsurprisingly, when courts put consideration of custom into the mix outside of the context of 
set dressing, we also see the frequent rejection of fair use defenses if defendants fail to conform 
to industry licensing norms; for example, short samples of music, the incidental display of 
sunglasses in an advertisement, course packets for classes at universities, and copies of articles 
for private researchers have all been judged infringing in large part because licensing such uses is 
the dominant practice in each instance.21  
 A second way that courts consider custom in the fair use context is to treat custom as 
reflective of what is “fair” in a more colloquial, gut-check sense of the word. When defendants 
do not follow industry practices or community or self-developed norms, they are viewed as 
wrong-doers not deserving of a fair use (or First Amendment) defense to their copying. In Roy 
Export Co. Establishment of Vaduz v. CBS, Inc., for example, both a district court and the Second 
Circuit held that failing to license film clips when it was industry custom to do so was unethical 
and a basis for rejecting both fair use and First Amendment defenses to copyright infringement.22 
In Roy Export, CBS aired a retrospective on the great film actor and director Charlie Chaplin 
soon after his death. CBS incorporated footage from both Chaplin’s copyrighted and 
uncopyrighted films in its broadcast without licensing the footage. In upholding a substantial jury 
verdict, the district court rejected a fair use defense on the grounds that “CBS’s conduct violated 
not only its own guidelines but also industry standards of ethical behavior.” The district court 
pointed to the industry’s licensing practices as evidence of harm to the potential market for the 
plaintiffs’ copyrighted works and of “bad faith.”23 In affirming the district court, the Second 
Circuit pointed to the same lack of conformity with in-house guidelines and industry practices as 
evidence of “commercial immorality,” and as a basis for rejecting CBS’s First Amendment 
defense.24  
 Similarly, nonconformity with more formal industry practices, such as use guidelines, has 
also been viewed as unfair. Most notably, the Agreement on Guidelines for Classroom Copying 
in Not-for-Profit Educational Institutions, usually shortened to the “Classroom Guidelines,” has 
been very influential in determining the scope of fair use in the context of classroom use of 
copyrighted materials.25 The Classroom Guidelines were developed during the drafting of the 
1976 Copyright Act at the behest of Congress. The Guidelines were developed and negotiated 
primarily by large publishers and a few author organizations with minimal to no input from 
educators and students. The Classroom Guidelines set forth recommended principles for 
determining when it is “fair” or lawful to use another’s copyrighted work in an educational 
setting. These guidelines, which were never adopted by statute, restrict how copyrighted works 
are used by educators and greatly influence courts when they analyze fair use claims. The 
extreme specificity of the Classroom Guidelines stands in stark contrast to the open-ended nature 
of the statutory and common law fair use criteria, greatly restricting the possible uses of 
copyrighted works. Although the Classroom Guidelines purport to set forth the “minimum” 
allowable uses, they have come to set a ceiling on allowable educational uses of materials. Not 
only is there vast conformity with the standards, but courts have routinely rejected fair use and 
found infringement when a party has not conformed to the purported floor of the Guidelines.26 
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This is true both because the nonconformity with the Guidelines is viewed as ethically unfair, 
and also because it demonstrates that the defendant is not paying the customary price.  
 Despite being problematic, it is not surprising that custom has been influential in the 
context of fair use determinations. The fair use doctrine is challenging for courts to apply. Fair 
use analysis has been termed “muddled,” “troublesome,” and “ad hoc.”27 As courts seek 
guidance through the fair use “thicket,”28 they sometimes turn to custom. A similar dynamic 
played out in the courts over the challenging determination of what is negligent conduct. Custom 
is an attractive proxy, but it is ultimately not a fully satisfying basis for determining negligence 
or fair use. Just as custom in the context of torts may allow obsolete and dangerous practices to 
remain in place in the face of technological innovations, overreliance on custom in the copyright 
context could write fair use out of the law. 
 Another reason courts turn to custom in the copyright context is that at common law 
courts referred to fair uses as those that were both “reasonable and customary.”29 Considering 
whether uses are customary has therefore long been a part of fair use analysis even though the 
statute no longer refers to this standard. The common law inquiry, however, was not solely about 
whether a use was customary. Instead, it had the additional component that required courts to 
also consider whether the practice was reasonable, regardless of whether it was customary. Many 
courts have ignored this independent reasonableness inquiry and treat what is customary as 
definitional of what is reasonable.  
 In sum, courts routinely consider industry practices and guidelines to evaluate fair use. 
This reliance on custom presents a number of significant concerns: First, the quality and 
reasonableness of the customs are not considered and therefore their incorporation risks the legal 
adoption of suboptimal and inappropriate practices and norms. Second, because of the 
dominance of a clearance culture—in which risk-averse licensing practices dominate –
consideration of custom risks making fair use obsolete. Finally, the incorporation of custom in 
many contexts has been one-sided—with courts often pointing to non-conformity with practices 
to reject fair use, but dismissing conformity with norms or practices as a basis to accept a fair use 
defense.  
 
THE PROMISE OF CUSTOM AND FAIR USE PROBLEM-SOLVING 
 
 Scholars and various use communities have recently sought out custom as a basis to 
delineate and establish fair uses. This interest in custom is not only driven by efforts to persuade 
courts to accept defenses in individual cases, but also by efforts to convince and empower 
individuals, organizations and companies to assert fair use rather than to conform with the 
dominant, risk-averse clearance culture. Just as the enclosure movement in England sparked 
arguments in favor of granting customary use rights to the public in the walled-off land, concerns 
over the increased propertization of intangible works that can form crucial pieces of our 
identities and culture has generated efforts to articulate justifications for public use of these 
works. The same tensions exist now as did then between those who worry about the tragedy of 
the commons—if land or IP is not exclusively owned—and those who worry about the opposite 
problem, the tragedy of the anti-commons—if everything is owned. Thus, it is unsurprising to 
see similar arguments about customary uses percolating up at this juncture in history. 
 The burgeoning best practices movement is a prime example of this. Most notably, the 
best practices statements developed by Peter Jaszi, Patricia Aufderheide, and others at American 
University and its Center for Social Media seek to establish what should be considered fair use in 
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particular communities based on the purported practices in those communities, as well as 
community-generated guidelines. The Center for Social Media continues to produce more and 
more of these best practices statements—most recently ones for the poetry community and 
academic and research libraries. Harvard’s Berkman Center for the Internet and Society, the 
American Library Association, and the Electronic Frontier Foundation also have endorsed the 
use of best practices statements to facilitate the assertion and support of fair use.  
 The most well-known of the best practices statements is the Documentary Filmmakers’ 
Statement of Best Practices in Fair Use. The Filmmakers’ Statement presents four categories of 
uses of others’ copyrighted works that are likely fair in the context of documentary films. The 
privileged categories are critique or commentary, illustrative quoting, incidental uses, and use in 
historical sequences. Each of these categories contains a number of “limitations.” Such 
limitations include, for example, that illustrative quoting or copying should be properly 
attributed, derived from different sources, “no longer than necessary to achieve the intended 
effect,” and not used to avoid “the cost or inconvenience of shooting equivalent footage.”30 
 Elsewhere I have critiqued the best practices statements on a variety of grounds, 
including that they exhibit some wishful thinking about fair use and contain some problematic 
limitations that exceed those required by fair use law.31 Here, however, I want to focus on the 
aspects of the statements that relate to custom. Proponents of the best practices statements and 
other forms of fair use guidelines have both explicitly—and sometimes implicitly—adopted a 
model of copyright law that incorporates custom as law. The Filmmakers’ Statement, for 
example, declares that “[f]air use is shaped in part, by the practice of the professional 
communities that employ it. . . . [F]or any particular field of critical or creative activity, such as 
documentary filmmaking, lawyers and judges consider professional expectations and practice in 
assessing what is ‘fair’ within the field.”32 This statement oversells the impact of industry 
practices in determining fair use, while at the same time also underselling the incorporation of 
industry practices to limit the scope of permissible uses. Because the best practices statements 
expressly endorse the role of custom in determining the scope of fair use, they risk becoming 
ceilings rather than floors on fair use. Alternatively, they might simply be dismissed as outlying 
practices or even non-practices that are more akin to wishful thinking by piratical users. Instead, 
courts are likely to embrace the more dominant clearance culture practices. Rather than 
challenging the validity of incorporating such restrictive practices, the statements endorse a 
world view that accepts the value of such practices as determinative of fair use.  
 The risk that the best practices statements will come, like the Classroom Guidelines, to 
stand for ceilings rather than floors on uses is particularly concerning since some of the 
limitations are unwarranted and severe. For example, the Filmmakers’ Statement limits incidental 
uses of music captured on film so that an editor and director cannot cut or edit a scene or 
sequence to the beat of the captured music or allow the music to spillover to another scene. 
Cutting to the rhythm of the music is an integral part of the craft of filmmaking and allowing 
music from one scene to spillover during a scene is an important technique. The Filmmakers’ 
Statement also concludes that documentary films cannot be designed around copyrighted works. 
Documentaries about war movies, the rock n’ roll star Elvis Presley, or the portrayal of gays and 
lesbians in film and television are all legitimate projects, yet the Filmmakers’ Statement throws 
them all into fair use purgatory or worse yet, infringement hell simply because they are designed 
to comment on copyrighted material. Such a conclusion is out of sync with the needs of 
filmmakers and the public. Other best practices statements similarly constrain users—for 
example, the OpenCourseWare Code restricts uses of copyrighted works by educators to single 
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examples and requires educators to remove incidentally captured copyrighted works. Moreover, 
the statements suggest a preference for licensing when material easily can be licensed at 
reasonable rates. This preference for licensing makes all unlicensed uses suspect and calls into 
question whether the movement’s goals of encouraging fair use are furthered or in fact 
undermined by these statements.  
 Recent legal scholarship has also sought to use custom to support fair use. In Michael 
Madison’s analysis of fair use he contends that fair use can be made more predictable if it is 
understood as protecting uses that fall within certain social and cultural patterns. He suggests that 
conformity with community practices in one of these given patterns should insulate users from 
liability for copyright infringement. For example, if a use is allegedly journalistic, then the norms 
and practices of the journalistic community should be used to assess first if the use is in fact 
journalistic in nature, and second, if it is, whether the use conforms with existing journalistic 
practice. One of the main motivations for Madison’s analysis was to suggest that at least some 
peer-to-peer file-sharing fits within an existing social and cultural pattern (of personal uses) and 
therefore is fair.33  
 Pamela Samuelson’s recent work on fair use similarly suggests that customary uses, at 
least those by authors, merit fair use protection. She points to note-taking, quotations, close 
paraphrasing, photocopying, and sketches as examples of activities that all promote authorship 
and have long been considered fair when engaged in by those creating new works.34 Samuelson 
declares that “whether a second author’s use is reasonable and customary in the authorial 
community in which he or she creates” is something courts should consider when evaluating fair 
use.35 Professor Samuelson views custom as an appropriate factor to consider, but she has agreed 
with me that custom should not be the sole measure of fair use.36  
 Although some on the copyleft see custom’s potential to support fair use, the realities of 
the courts’ treatment of custom suggests that these advocates may be walking into a minefield. 
Not only are there dangers that such projects will backfire, but reliance on such practices and 
norms to shape fair use rests on normative and theoretical thin ice. 
 
QUESTIONABLE JUSTIFICATIONS FOR USING CUSTOM AS A PROXY FOR FAIR USE 
 
 The recent efforts to advocate for the expansion of fair use on the basis of custom have 
some appeal, but given the reality that courts have often used industry practices to narrow the 
scope of fair use, one has reason to pause before advocating greater reliance on custom as a basis 
for expanding or protecting uses of copyrighted works. Not only have courts looked to custom to 
cabin rather than to expand fair use, but the public use and access rights to land rooted in custom 
have largely become disfavored in the United States—our legal system has favored strong 
private property rights even when they limit longstanding public uses of that property. It thus is 
quite a stretch to think that customary use is the way back from the abyss of the anti-commons. 
Even if we take a step back from this healthy dose of legal realism, there are reasons to question 
the usefulness and appropriateness of custom as a proxy for what uses should be deemed fair.  
 The common law preferred custom not because it was superior, but because there was 
little else in its place as a starting point. As James Carter Coolidge observed: “Custom [] is the 
only law we discover at the beginning of society . . . .”37 Now that we have a developed legal 
system, custom should rarely be the measure of the law. Three of the primary justifications 
advanced today for relying on custom in various contexts suggest that consideration of custom is 
less justifiable in the copyright context than in many other circumstances.  The first major 
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justification for relying on custom to establish legal rules is that custom may best reflect optimal 
rules in a given market. In common law terms this might be framed as “the community knows 
best.” In the context of copyright transactions this would mean that custom would reflect the 
optimal development of copyrighted works and a balance between the exclusionary owners’ 
rights and the public’s use and access rights to those works. In the context of copyright markets, 
there are reasons to doubt the optimality of industry practices because they are often generated 
by efforts to avoid litigation or preserve relationships. Licensing material or removing material 
from new works is common not because it is optimal, but because the outcome of fair use 
litigation is unpredictable and litigation itself is so expensive. Moreover, guessing wrong about 
the likely success of a fair use defense comes with a severe downside—high statutory damages 
and possible criminal liability. Such a risk makes it rare that parties who can obtain permission 
for a reasonable (or even unreasonable) licensing fee will risk litigating fair use. This rational 
choice by individual actors is not an optimal or preferred choice for society.  
 Another reason that copyright markets are less likely to generate welfare-maximizing 
practices is that they are not particularly close-knit and have fewer repeat transactions between 
the same parties, thereby contrasting with other industries and communities in which norms and 
practices have been celebrated as preferential to externally imposed laws. The different economic 
power of players in copyright markets also suggests that customs will likely skew toward the 
interests of the most powerful owners of copyrighted content at the expense of others. 
 Despite such concerns, some, such as Richard Epstein, have argued in response to my 
work that negotiated licenses and other clearance culture practices actually reflect optimal 
private ordering based on mutually agreed to pricing.38 There are a number of flaws with such a 
conclusion. First, negotiating licensing agreements is challenging, especially for smaller players 
or when a potential user has a limited amount of time to obtain permission for the use. Content 
owners sometimes cannot be located or do not respond at all or in a timely manner to requests for 
permission to license works. These challenges lead to significant transaction costs that warp the 
market for these licenses. Second, content owners sometimes refuse to license at any price or 
charge a prohibitively high or simply unreasonable fee for use. Third, because fair use works in 
conjunction with the exclusive rights of copyright holders to promote the overall public interest 
in generating more works and more knowledge, we cannot simply look at an individual 
transaction and evaluate the optimality between the owner and user, as compared to litigation 
costs——we must also consider the costs to society more broadly. Optimality in the sense of 
maximizing wealth is not the only consideration at issue here. We must also maximize creativity, 
knowledge, and liberty. Fair use is more than simply a mechanism for optimizing the production 
of creative works; it prevents copyright law from unreasonably interfering with the free speech 
and liberty rights of others. Given copyright’s status as a government entitlement such concerns 
are particularly appropriate counterweights. 
 A second justification for incorporating custom is that even if suboptimal, the resulting 
legal rules are fair because they satisfy parties’ expectations.39 In the copyright context, however, 
expectations often do not track the relevant customs, and even when they do, it may not be 
appropriate to determine the scope of copyright law on the basis of such expectations given the 
countervailing public interests at stake. For example, the New York Times recently hired a talent 
agency to assist with licensing its news stories for use in television shows and movies. The New 
York Times’s expectation that it can extract compensation for news that is in the public domain 
or an industry practice of licensing such stories should not alter copyright law’s exclusion of 
facts from its reach. Not only can expectations push the law in ways contrary to public policy, 
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but expectations can also lock-in existing property regimes even when they are unjust and even 
when the parties themselves might prefer a different arrangement. Such expectations may simply 
reflect resignation rather than preferred rules.  
 The final common justification for incorporating custom is the furtherance of autonomy 
interests. Early justifications for the common law expressed a preference for communities being 
governed by their own customary laws that had evolved over a period of time. These laws not 
only furthered parties’ expectations of how given behavior would be treated, but also injected a 
degree of community self-governance and autonomy in what would otherwise be a suspect 
rulemaking process handed down from a monarchy. Today, the democratic process allows 
communities to contribute in a more orderly fashion to the creation of governing laws, and 
accordingly, the appeal of the common law has faded. But even in contemporary legal debates, 
the issue of whether laws should be driven by the private or public sphere continues to fuel many 
discussions. Given copyright’s public-regarding goals, deference to private ordering is less 
appropriate than in other business contexts. 
 Moreover, there are conflicting autonomy interests at stake. As I have discussed 
elsewhere, non-owners have liberty and autonomy-based interests in using copyrighted works.40 
Copyright is a statutory grant of a limited property right in exchange for the public disclosure of 
a work. There is a bargain worked by the legal protection that requires some relinquishment of 
autonomy interests when one makes one’s copyrighted work public. Although a work is 
copyrighted upon fixation regardless of whether it is published, infringement actions require 
demonstration of access to the work, which usually requires having made it public. Additionally, 
to the extent that a party wishes to monetize the copyrighted work it must be made public——
something it is assumed that authors and copyright holders will want to do. Thus, the autonomy 
interests of an author must yield to those of her audience. 
 
COMMON LAW LIMITS ON CUSTOM 
 
 Despite this critique of the wholesale incorporation of custom, custom continues to 
provide some pertinent and meaningful information, including for evaluations of fair use. But 
before considering the value of any particular custom, we need a system to distinguish the 
practices and norms worthy of consideration from those that should be dismissed. The common 
law provides some guidance on how to make such assessments.  
 Early common law scholars and courts had a much more moderated view of custom than 
contemporary scholars sometimes recognize. William Blackstone and Matthew Hale in England, 
and Oliver Wendell Holmes Jr. in America, recognized that not all customs made for appropriate 
legal rules. Practices and norms sometimes developed in a haphazard manner that created rules 
that defied logic or that became obsolete given societal or technological changes.41 The common 
law therefore limited the use of custom in a number of important ways. Before being considered 
worthy of legal recognition, a custom needed to be deemed both legal and good.42 To meet this 
standard, a custom had to pass a number of hurdles. Blackstone’s work provides the most famous 
delineation of these common law limits on custom. Blackstone provides seven express limits on 
custom; to be both legal and good customs must be “immemorial,” “continued,” “peaceable,” 
“reasonable,” “certain,” “compulsory,” and “consistent.”43 For purposes of this discussion I will 
largely track Blackstone’s enumeration of these limits, but I will synthesize these limits into four 
broad conceptual categories that best reveal these limits’ continued relevance. The four 
conceptual categories that I use are first, limits that relate to the certainty of the custom; second, 
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limits that demonstrate the consent of the people to the custom; third, the absence of conflicts 
between the custom and other laws and customs; and finally, the fourth limit, that the custom 




 There are a variety of common law limits on custom that each addresses the certainty of 
the custom. Before deserving judicial consideration, a custom must be proven to exist, and its 




 Consent was the key justification for custom at common law, and many of the limits on 
custom are at their root about whether the community agreed to the alleged practice or norm. The 
continuity of the custom, its longevity and agreement about its contours, demonstrated a 
consensus by a community with regard to the practice that suggested likely consent.45  The 
requirement that a custom must have been so longstanding or immemorial that no one could 
remember a time without that custom being in place also reflected a community’s likely consent 
to that custom.46 Other evidence of consent was that the custom be peaceable. Peaceability 
required demonstration that a custom was undisputed. This was an important component because 
disagreements over a custom’s validity called into question the community’s consent to that 
custom. The custom also needed to be compulsory in the sense that everyone in the relevant 
community needed to follow that custom rather than having obedience to the custom be at the 
“option of every man[.]”47  
 
Absence of Conflicts 
 
 Even if a custom were universally accepted, understood, and followed in a given 
community, it might still violate a superior governing rule. Common law courts would therefore 
analyze whether the given custom conflicted with any other custom or law.48 This requirement 
was sometimes referred to as requiring consistency.49 Custom could not contradict laws set forth 




 The courts would also consider whether the custom was reasonable, regardless of its 
acceptance or duration.51 The fact that something has been accepted and practiced for a long time 
might reflect its wisdom, but more is meant by the reasonableness inquiry than mere deference to 
the custom as a proxy for what is reasonable. Determination of whether a custom is reasonable 
has long been a challenging inquiry. Blackstone noted that because of this courts often 
considered a slightly different and easier inquiry—evaluating whether the custom was 
“unreasonable.”52 J.H. Balfour Browne writing in 1875 suggested that if there was no reason to 
the contrary, one might defer to custom, but if there was reason to question whether the custom 
was good, courts could reject the practice or norm. In particular, Browne focused on whether the 
practice benefited the people. “A custom [] which is injurious to the public, which is prejudicial 
to a class, and beneficial only to a particular individual, is repugnant to the law of reason. No 
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such custom could be capable of becoming law which is a rule for the benefit of all.”53 As 
Jeremy Bentham observed: “To prove the existence of a practise is one thing, to prove the 
expediency of establishing it by force of law is another.”54 Bentham points to Lord Bacon’s 
advice that one should “Let Reason be pregnant, Custom barren” to highlight his skepticism that 
customary practices and norms are likely to reflect a preferred legal rule.55 Similarly, the great 
justice Benjamin Cardozo suggested that “social needs” justify “sacrific[ing] custom in the 
pursuit of other and larger ends.”56 Cardozo noted that while “history and custom have their 
place,” “[e]thical considerations” and the “welfare of society” must rule the day.57 Although 
Cardozo observed that social welfare was difficult to determine and ethical considerations could 
be contested, he pointed to fundamental underpinnings of our constitutional democracy that 
could not be sacrificed in the name of custom or common law.58  
 Despite these longstanding limits on custom, when courts and scholars consider the use 
of custom in copyright law these limits have rarely been considered. Courts have simply not 
scrutinized the quality and value of particular practices and norms in the copyright context.  
 
RETHINKING THE ROLE OF CUSTOM THROUGH A CONTEMPORARY COPYRIGHT LENS 
 
 The ignorance of common law limits may be driven in part by a lack of awareness that 
courts are engaged with the analysis of custom; but, if custom is to have any influence in 
intellectual property law, then a more thoughtful and nuanced view of it must be adopted. It is 
therefore worth considering how one should evaluate custom today. Without limits on the 
incorporation of custom we risk not only incorporating bad rules, but also shoring up a feedback 
loop in which the law reinforces problematic practices and then further entrenches them into the 
law.59 We have seen this problem with particular prominence in the context of licensing markets 
for copyrighted works. 
 The common law’s focus on certainty, consent, lack of conflicts and reasonableness are 
all relevant today. As I have elaborated elsewhere, I do not think that custom should be 
incorporated wholesale into determinations of fair use. Nevertheless, custom may provide some 
guidance into what is reasonable or appropriate in a particular context, and thereby likely fair. In 
the past, I have developed six vectors that should be evaluated when considering whether 
practices or norms are useful indicators of fairness in the context of intellectual property.60 Here I 
will condense these into four primary areas of evaluation: (1) the certainty of the custom; (2) the 
motivation for the custom; (3) the representativeness of the custom; and (4) the implications of 
adopting the custom. I will briefly elaborate on each of these considerations and their 
connections to the traditional common law limits on custom. As part of this analysis I will 
consider a few relevant examples, especially the recently propounded best practices statement for 
documentary filmmakers, and evaluate them in the context of fair use.  
 
Certainty of the Custom 
 
 To have any value, a custom must be identifiable, in terms of what constitutes the practice 
itself, and the practice must also be widely accepted and followed. This analysis tracks that of 
Blackstone’s requirement that practices be certain before meriting judicial consideration. Several 
considerations help to evaluate how certain a particular custom is. First, if there is unanimity as 
to the contours of the custom among diverse parties it is more likely to exist and have clearly 
definable boundaries. Such agreement confirms the likely consent of the community. Second, 
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customs that are longstanding are more stable and hence more certain because they have 
weathered the test of time.  
 Because the best practices statements are more wishful than descriptive and have fuzzy 
boundaries, they are not particularly certain. Although the best practices statements purport to set 
forth the practices of the relevant communities, they instead set forth what the drafters think the 
community should be doing. In the context of the Filmmakers’ Statement, for example, the report 
leading up to the statement and the statement itself both reveal that the dominant practice was to 
license or cut out copyrighted materials from documentaries. If courts take seriously the call to 
incorporate customary practices, then such clearance practices may narrow rather than expand 
fair use. Second, under the guidelines of the Filmmakers’ Statement evaluations must be made of 
whether the “extent of the use is appropriate,” quotes are no “longer than necessary” and 
attribution was “reasonably possible.” These inquiries do not provide certain guidelines worthy 
of deference as custom. Instead, they leave the same ambiguities of the existing fair use system, 
but add an additional layer of complexity to the already convoluted fair use analysis. 
 In other instances, we see conflicting customs at work. For example, in the Roy Export 
case described earlier—in which a court rejected fair use and First Amendment defenses for the 
use of clips of Charlie Chaplin films in a news obituary of Chaplin—the court rejected fair use 
on the basis that the defendant did not conform to custom. The court failed to consider, however, 
that there was more than one custom at work. Clips were not usually licensed for obituaries even 
though they were often licensed in other contexts for projects with more lead time or scripted 
series. Such conflicting customs suggest either that the court needed to more carefully scrutinize 
which custom was applicable or that there was no single, dominant, and widely-accepted custom 
worthy of consideration. 
 
Motivation for Custom 
 
 Motivation was not a common law limit on custom; however, sitting underneath the 
understanding that custom was valuable was a belief that custom reflected the preferences of a 
particular community. In other words, if the community had been asked to sit around and agree 
to what the rule should be this is likely the rule they would have come up with—or at least if 
such a rule had been suggested to them they would have agreed to it. In the context of copyright 
then, the practices and norms that will be the most valuable will be those that reflect preferred 
allocations between copyright holders’ and users’ interests rather than customs driven by 
litigation avoidance. Litigation-avoidance norms arise when laws are uncertain or the expense of 
litigation discourages resort to the legal system. Such norms do not reflect a preferred or 
aspirational allocation between the exclusive rights of copyright owners and the ability of others 
to use those works. Both the licensing practices exemplified in the Ringgold decision and the use 
guidelines, like the Classroom Guidelines, are examples of such litigation-avoidance customs. 
These reactive customs—developed to address the shortcomings of the legal regime—are not the 
sort of aspirational, independently developed customs that others, such as Robert Ellickson, have 
appreciated in other contexts.61 When customs have developed with aspirational motivations 
behind them they are better indications of what is appropriate. In the context of fair use, practices 
and norms should primarily be relevant only to the extent that they are indicative of what is 
actually deemed “fair” by the relevant community rather than what that community thinks is 
colorable or safe under the law.  
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 As part of considering the motivation for a particular custom, courts should particularly 
try to engage with whether the custom was intended to provide an appropriate balance between 
competing interests. As a check on this analysis, courts should independently evaluate whether 
reasonable people would agree to such rules if they knew neither whether they would be 





 The common law focus on the importance of custom reflecting the will and consent of the 
people is instructive. Customs that represent only one party’s or one group’s interests are suspect. 
By contrast, when a custom develops with input and participation of both copyright owners and 
users and large and small players, it is more valuable. The best practices statements are highly 
unrepresentative and therefore of limited value. Like the Classroom Guidelines (which the 
authors of the best practices statements criticize for being one-sided), none of the best practices 
statements included representation by the most affected parties—the content providers whose 
work is most likely to be appropriated. The fact that some of the users are also authors does not 
remedy this one-sidedness. After all, almost everyone—if not absolutely everyone—is an author 
of copyrighted work. Although the proponents of the statements are likely correct that if they had 
invited larger content owners to the table very little would have been agreed upon, the fact that 
the parties could not have agreed to any common principles should raise serious flags about 
using the articulated practices to affect entitlements outside of that community. Not only were the 
copyright holders that were most likely to be injured by the uses not invited to the table, but the 
public at large was not included even though the statements potentially limit the types of uses 
that we can make.  
 Although not an explicit consideration at common law, the application of custom was 
limited to the community that had developed the particular custom at issue. Customs were never 
supposed to be applied outside the relevant community. Doing so would fly in the face of the 
primary limit on custom—that it must demonstrate the consent of those governed by the practice 
or norm.62 It therefore is particularly inappropriate in the context of copyright law to apply 




 Another way of thinking about the common law requirement that customs must be 
independently evaluated to determine if they are reasonable is to consider the likely implications 
of adopting such practices, not just in the immediate case but more broadly. Courts must 
independently scrutinize the implications of adopting any customary practice or norm as a legal 
rule. When evaluating the worth of a particular custom, a court must consider what the end result 
of incorporating that custom would be. If followed to its logical conclusion, will the custom 
result in a slippery slope, such that no uses will be allowed, or, alternatively, that too many uses 
will be allowed? In either scenario, courts should reject customary practices. Consider, for 
example, two extremes. If it is customary to license everything, then no fair uses remain. On the 
flipside, consider the heyday of free peer-to-peer file-sharing in which the custom was not to pay 
for any music downloaded from the web. Such a custom could destroy the entire market for 
music online.  
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 In the best practices statement related to user-generated content (“UGC”) (in the context 
of online video) virtually any use is deemed fair because the commentary and critique category is 
read very broadly. For example, in the report supporting the Online Video Code, the drafters 
suggest that a mash-up titled Clint Eastwood’s “The Office”—which mixed together clips from 
the television series The Office with the movie Evan Almightly to show what it would be like if 
Clint Eastwood directed an episode of The Office—falls within the favored category of negative 
or critical commentary. This category and its exemplars suggest that all mash-ups are fair use. 
This means that there can be no market for licensing such mash-ups; a conclusion that pulls the 
rug out from under a possible new media market and makes copyright law virtually irrelevant in 
the context of UGC. 
 In sum, if custom is certain, representative, motivated by aspirational purposes, and 
would result in a reasonable allocation of use and ownership rights, then that custom will likely 
provide meaningful guidance for evaluating fair use in that particular context. Otherwise, such 
practices and norms should be met with great skepticism and little deference. 
 
RECONCEPTUALIZING THE ROLE OF CUSTOM IN COPYRIGHT 
 
 Despite the many reasons discussed to be cautious about jumping on the custom 
bandwagon, custom provides a number of broader lessons for copyright policy. First, massive 
disobedience of copyright law in given categories can signal market failure or overreaching by 
copyright holders. The copyright system needs some public buy-in to work. Public support 
requires people to think that on some level copyright law is fair. When copyright law is wildly 
out of sync with community practices there may be value in interpreting copyright to conform to 
those understandings or better yet amending the copyright act to reflect some of those norms. 
 Second, customary uses may demonstrate a consensus about preferred rights that may not 
be appropriately recognized under the law. For example, many norms in the copyright world 
favor giving attribution to authors when their work is used, but the law does not generally 
recognize such a right. Such locations of commonality suggest promising areas for advocating 
for legal change and the express adoption of commonly accepted principles.  
 Third, custom may demonstrate areas of need by users and creators that must be 
accommodated either through a reasonable market mechanism or through fair use. There are a 
number of categories of uses of copyrighted works that some scholars and courts have treated as 
prima facie fair because they are “customary.” Although courts have mostly used custom to 
reject fair use defenses, on several occasions courts have pointed to “years of accepted practice” 
as a basis to establish fair use. In William & Wilkins Co v. United States, for example, the Court 
of Claims held that the practice of making copies for research purposes was a customary fair 
use.63 Many of these “customary uses” are simply uses that have been established at common 
law and now exist because they are uncontroversial legal precedents. Over time, these precedents 
form categories of uses that are likely (and predictably) fair—but this is a very different 
understanding than that they are fair because they are customary. In other words, one way of 
thinking about customary uses is simply as precedents.  
 Additionally, the normative underpinnings of these decisions are much more important 
than their customary nature. Consider, for example, the “customary” use of copyrighted works in 
biographies.64 As with personal copies for research, we have seen practices in the context of 
biographical works shift over time toward a permission-only culture. Instead of adopting 
customary uses or industry practices wholesale then, we should evaluate the specific practices 
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that have developed and consider whether they are appropriate. Permitting some uses of 
copyrighted works in biographical works is necessary. The fact that such uses have been 
permitted over time may signal the importance of such uses, but it should not be dispositive.  
Similarly, if such uses cease to occur because of risk-averse publishing houses, the reasonable 
use of copyrighted works in biographies should nevertheless remain fair. 
 A fourth insight from custom and the common law comes from the common law 
requirement that a custom must be consented to by the relevant community. This requirement of 
consent suggests an important avenue for counteracting the incorporation of the clearance 
culture—active, vocal and public dissent from these restrictive practices. I have previously 
advocated for such dissent from the dominant and restrictive practices in intellectual property 
markets.65 One of the purported values of using custom to set the law is that it reflects a “shared 
sense of its reasonableness and historical appropriateness.”66 When it does not, the custom is 
neither legal nor good.  
 Finally, the common law provides at least one other important insight. The acceptance of 
some customary uses of private lands was limited to those uses that were rooted either in 
subsistence or communal recreation. Similarly, public use of copyrighted works is appropriate 
when the uses are for subsistence rather than exploitation, and sometimes also when uses 
facilitate community-building. What does subsistence mean in the context of copyright? From 
the perspective of users, certain copyrighted works cannot be substituted for and form an 
important part of both personal and cultural identity and expression—accordingly there must be 
some ability to use such works without permission or payment.67 With this in mind, compare two 
different types of uses: first, the use of limited film clips for illustrative and historical purposes in 
a documentary (or even fiction film); second, unlicensed peer-to-peer filesharing that reflects the 
need to access music in digital formats quickly. The former might be an appropriate fair use even 
if there is a licensing market, whereas the latter might only be fair until an alternative market 
mechanism forms. The enumerated Section 107 categories also signal areas where subsistence 
rather than exploitation usually rules. For example, one must be able to quote from copyrighted 
works to provide meaningful scholarly commentary, reporting or review of such works.   
 
A CODA: OVERLAPPING STATUTES AND THE COMMON LAW 
 
 There has long been disagreement among legal scholars about whether legislation—
passed by a representative government—or judge-made (or judge-declared) law purportedly 
interpreting or incorporating community practice is more reflective of the will of the people. 
Today, arguments about public choice and legislative capture suggest that even if one prefers 
legislative rulemaking to incorporating custom, one should be concerned about whether the 
public interest is being served in today’s legislative bodies, especially in the context of 
intellectual property law. Custom is an attractive counterpoint to such dangers, but it is also 
fraught with its own risks. The United States and particularly copyright law has veered toward 
legislation over custom, but the interpretation and application of that legislation has long been 
informed by practices and norms. As Justice Cardozo wrote in the 1920s with regard to the 
United States legal system: “[W]e look to custom, not so much for the creation of new rules, but 
for the tests and standards that are to determine how established rules shall be applied. When 
custom seeks to do more than this, there is a growing tendency in the law to leave development 
to legislation.”68 Custom can provide valuable information, but its usefulness depends on 
independently evaluating the worthiness of the custom and particularly scrutinizing its 
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reasonableness and its likely reflection of a community’s consent to the relevant practice or 
norm. The common law has told us this for hundreds of years, now all we need to do is listen. 
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